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Summary
In social dilemmas, the ability of individuals to coordinate
their actions is crucial to reach group optima [1]. Unless
exacted by power or force, coordination in humans relies
on a common understanding of the problem [2], which is
greatly facilitated by communication [3, 4]. The lack of
means of consultation about the nature of the problem and
how to solve it may explain why multiagent coordination in
nonhuman vertebrates has commonly been observed only
when multiple individuals react instantaneously to a single
stimulus, either natural or experimentally simulated [5, 6],
for example a predator [7, 8], a prey [9, 10], or a neighboring
group [11–14]. Herewe report how vervetmonkeys solved an
experimentally induced coordination problem. In each
of three groups, we trained a low-ranking female, the
‘‘provider,’’ to open a container holding a large amount of
food, which the providers only opened when all individuals
dominant to them (‘‘dominants’’) stayed outside an imagi-
nary ‘‘forbidden circle’’ around it. Without any human guid-
ance, the dominants learned restraint one by one, in hierar-
chical order from high to low. Once all dominants showed
restraint immediately at the start of the trial, the providers
opened the container almost instantly, saving all individuals
opportunity costs due to lost foraging time. Solving this
game required trial-and-error learning based on individual
feedback from the provider to each dominant, and all domi-
nants being patient enough to wait outside the circle while
others learned restraint. Communication, social learning,
and policing by high-ranking animals played no perceptible
role.
Results
The Provider’s Dread of Having Dominants Close by
Creates a ‘‘Forbidden Circle’’
The experiment with the captive Strasbourg group ran from
March to September 2004 and consisted of 44 trials during
which the provider could once per trial open her container
filled with about 1 kg of small pieces of canned peaches or
apricots and dried figs. The two wild groups, Donga and
Picnic, were studied in Loskop Dam Nature Reserve, South
Africa. We conducted 40 trials, which correspond to the*Correspondence: ronald.noe@gmail.com‘‘single provider’’ trials of the biological market experiment
we reported previously [15], in two blocks: 24 trials from
October 2005 to January 2006, and 16 trials from May to
June 2006. Here the reward consisted of 120 small pieces of
apple (about 750 g), but in order to reduce pressure on the
provider, we threw 48 extra pieces 3–5 m from the container
after the provider opened it during a first block of 24 trials.
We did this to enlarge the food patch, fearing that otherwise
there would be too much pressure on the provider, which
could discourage her from approaching the container in later
trials. In hindsight, this fear was unfounded in the case of the
Donga group, but the provider of the Picnic group was indeed
attacked by the highest-ranking female (F2) just before we
could provide the extra apples in the first two trials. The extra
applesweremainly consumedby low-ranking animals and had
little effect on the amounts consumed by the dominants. We
therefore had no reason to expect, nor did we see any indica-
tions, that the extra apples changed the behavior of the domi-
nants before the opening of the box in any way. No trial ended
before the provider had touched the container, so we only had
to reward her for touching the lid at first and subsequently for
touching a red paint mark by opening the container using our
remote control, a classical training method known as
‘‘shaping’’ [16]. The training of the three providers took only
a few trials each.
The reward never lasted longer than 3 min (range 66–178 s)
after the opening of the container. Vervet monkeys have cheek
pouches in which they can tuck away pieces of fruit as fast as
their hands can grab it. This means that delays measured in
seconds were significant in the scramble competition for the
reward. High-ranking animals could claim the best spots but
rarely gained a competitive advantage through overt aggres-
sion. Dominants concentrated on grabbing pieces of fruit for
themselves rather than chasing others away, which would
only have freed the way for third parties. Thus, although the
quantity of the reward was such that most animals had
a good chance of obtaining some fruit in each trial and re-
mained interested in the reward, a combination of arrival order
and rank determined the portion each individual got.
The rank orders of all three groups were linear, and there
were eight individuals dominant to the provider in Stras-
bourg, five in Donga, and three in Picnic (Table 1). None of
the three providers approached the container unless all
dominants were roughly 10 m or more away from it, but
they did so quickly once the dominants were all sufficiently
far away (Figure 1). A distance of 10 m gave a head start to
the provider that might seem slight, but the median time
that the dominants needed to cover 10 m was about 6 s
(range 4–15 s), which was worth about five pieces of fruit to
the provider. The dominants often climbed a tree just outside
the forbidden circle to keep an eye on the container and so
lost a few extra seconds by having to climb down first (see
Figure S2 available online). The three providers did not
tolerate each dominant at exactly the same minimum
distance. In general, the more powerful the dominant was
relative to the provider, the greater the minimum distance
at which the provider tolerated the dominant. The distance
to the container is, in fact, a proxy for the time it takes to
Table 1. Dominance Hierarchy of the Adult Members in the Three Groups
Strasbourg M1 – M2 – F3 – F4 – F5 – F6 – F7 – F8 – F9* – M10 – F11 – F12
Donga M1 – F2 – F3 – F4 – F5 – F6* – M7 – M8 – F9 – F10
Picnic M1 – F2 – M3 – F4* – M5 – F6 – F7
M = male; F = female. Numbers indicate rank, with 1 = highest rank. Aster-
isks indicate providers. For tests of linearity and steepness, see Supple-
mental Results.
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666reach the container, and we assume that the provider esti-
mated the time it would take a particular dominant to reach
the container from a particular location. The ‘‘forbidden
circle’’ that we refer to is therefore in reality a collection of
frayed circles with diameters somewhere between 10 and
15 m rather than a single neat circle with a 10 m radius.
Our game theoretical analysis of the experiment allows for
individual-specific minimal distances, as long as these differ-
ences are not too large.
The Learning Process of the Dominants: Individually, Fast,
and Down the Hierarchy
In contrast to standard coordination experiments with both
humans and nonhumans, andmore in line with naturally occur-
ring problems, at the time the experiment started no vervet
knew that the provider could unlock the food container.
Furthermore, all had to learn that she approached the
container only if all those dominant to her stayed sufficiently
far away. The food was so attractive, however, that all vervets
had a natural inclination to guard and monopolize the
container. From each dominant’s viewpoint, and before
learning more about the provider’s role and preferences, there
was a choice between controlling a rich prize and leaving it up
for grabs for other members of the group. By approaching and
guarding the closed container, a dominant thus acted out of
(mistaken) self-interest and harmed the group’s public
interest. For the coordination problem to be solved, it was
thus necessary that all dominants learn to avoid this tempting
strategy and keep the distance the provider required.
Figure 2 gives the cumulative number of minutes that each
dominant was at less than 10 m from the container over the
series of trials. Following common practice in learning
research, we calculated the best-fitting Weibull function
[17]. After verifying the close fit with the empirical data, we
calculated breakpoint values to determine the trial at which
the behavior of each dominant showed a significant change
(details in Supplemental Results). Figures 2 and 3 show that
the animals learned sequentially rather than simultaneously.
For both Strasbourg and Donga, the learning order correlated
closely with the rank order (Spearman tests; Strasbourg:
n = 8, r = 0.98, p < 0.001; Donga: n = 5, r = 0.98, p = 0.05).
In Picnic, the three dominants showed restraint in the order
2nd in rank (alpha female) > 1st (alpha male) > 3rd (beta
male). Once all dominants had learned to stay out of the
forbidden circle from the start, there was no relapse. From
that trial onward, no dominant came close to the container
before it was opened, not even after a break of more than
six months (208 days for Donga; 195 days for Picnic),
between the two trial blocks in the Loskop groups (Figures
2 and 3). The dominants thus learned one after the other
and, with few exceptions, in hierarchical order from high to
low. The steep ascent in the Weibull curves (Figure 2) indi-
cates that most animals needed only a few trials to learn
self-restraint, but there was little evidence for systematic
single-trial learning.The ‘‘Forbidden Circle Game’’
We offer a post hoc analysis of a stylized ‘‘Forbidden Circle
game’’ in which all dominants are assumed to choose their
position relative to the container independently of each other
on the basis of cues each of them has received from the
provider. All dominants act as players that each individually
have an incentive to remain close to the center of a circle but,
in order to obtain a share of a communal reward, have to learn
to leave it simultaneously. A single player lingering in the circle
prevents all players from obtaining any reward, making this
player comparable to the weakest link in a chain. A similar
‘‘weakest link coordination problem’’ confronts groups of
diners that go hungry while waiting for the last person to
show up before being seated [18]. Note that ‘‘coordination’’
refers to an observed outcome of behavioral choices, such
as waiting patiently for others to learn, and not to attempts to
‘‘coordinate’’ with others. Also, the Forbidden Circle game is
usedasamodel of a coordinationproblembut is not a standard
coordination game with multiple Nash equilibria.
We first describe the game structure as external observers
who are completely informed about the role of the provider
and about her reluctance to open the container with dominants
nearby. We then take the viewpoint of a dominant with incom-
plete information and see how his or her assessment of the
payoffs is likely to evolve while learning about the role of the
provider and her reaction to dominants. How agents figure
out which game they are playing is considered to be an impor-
tant but understudied question [18, 19]. Most multiagent
experimental games played in laboratories also require novel
behavior, but both human [18] and animal [20, 21] participants
usually learn the rules, possible actions, and payoffs through
training or instruction, and their grasp of the game is verified
before the actual experiments start. In real life, however,
players are often confronted with unfamiliar situations in which
it is not obvious that coordination yields higher payoffs than
the pursuit of private gains. The present coordination problem
therefore is a much more natural challenge than most experi-
mental coordination problems reported so far, even though
the provider’s privileged role was created experimentally.
The players have three possible actions to choose from:
G (guarding the container and/or trying to open it),W (watching
the container from outside the forbidden circle), and R (roam-
ing, which allows foraging, social interactions, and so forth but
prevents monitoring the container). At the moment of opening,
action W yields a higher payoff than action R, independent of
the rank of the player. When all players are completely
informed and rational, they should leave the forbidden circle
as soon as the trial starts but remain as close to the container
as the provider allows, i.e., wait just outside the forbidden
circle. This is the unique undominated Nash equilibrium of
the game with full information. The animals do not have essen-
tial pieces of information, however, and can only acquire these
by learning. Approaching and trying to guard the still closed
container, the ‘‘myopic’’ action G, is the natural initial choice,
as we could observe (Figure 3). AllG andW players pay oppor-
tunity costs due to lost roaming time as long as at least one
player chooses action G. R players do not pay these opportu-
nity costs, but the longer the opening is delayed, themore food
depletion in the vicinity of the container reduces their feeding
rate, pushing them away from the container. As long as the
opening of the container is delayed long enough to make the
value of roaming offset the advantage of arriving early, action
R yields higher payoff than action W; hence, learning individ-
uals should switch from G to R. The more dominants learn to
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Figure 1. Correlations between the Time Domi-
nants Went beyond the Critical Distance and
the Moment the Provider Opened the Container
x axis represents trial number; y axis represents
time elapsed after start of trial. The black line
represents the time the last animal dominant to
the provider left the 10 m radius circle around
the container. The filled colored line represents
the time the container was opened. Spearman
rank correlations between ‘‘forbidden circle left’’
and ‘‘container opened’’: Strasbourg: r = 0.999,
p < 0.01; Donga: r = 0.830, p < 0.01; Picnic:
r = 0.837, p < 0.01.
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667show restraint, the shorter the time until the provider arrives
and, with short opening times, it becomes optimal for players
to switch from R to W. Our game theoretic analysis indicates
that this switching will be in hierarchical order, from high to
low, with players ultimately reaching the Nash equilibrium
(see Supplemental Game Theoretic Analysis for a detailed
analysis of the game).
Discussion
Alternative Solutions that Were Not Used
An appreciation of the reaction of the provider to the behavior
of other dominantswouldhaveallowed faster learningby imita-
tion, or eventually emulation [22], of the other dominants’
behavior. After the animal at the head of the queue, henceforth
called ‘‘Alpha,’’ learned restraint, all the others could in prin-
ciple have imitated Alpha’s behavior and eventually become
an imitated model in turn. In that case, we should have seen
all dominants ranking below Alpha showing restraint more or
less simultaneously within the next few trials, unless each indi-
vidual would have needed one or more direct interactions with
the provider to test whether the latter indeed reacted as anti-
cipated. Yet, any form of social learning should have led to anacceleration of the learning process
further down the queue, but this is not
obvious from our data (Figure 3). The
time lapse between two dominants
learning restraint was not noticeably
shorter further down the learning queue
in the two larger groups (Figures 2 and
3).Our resultsdonot allowus tocategor-
ically exclude that the animals benefited
from some social learning, however.
The ability to project oneself in the
role of another interacting with a third
party, which would imply having at least
some degree of ‘‘theory of mind’’ [23],
would also have allowed high-ranking
dominants to punish [24] lower-ranking
ones for not leaving the forbidden circle,
i.e., to solve the problem by policing
[25]. We never observed behavior by
dominants that could be interpreted as
preventing lower-ranking dominants
from entering the forbidden circle,
however. Vervets probably have the
required knowledge of the dominance
relationships of their group members
[26], but whether monkeys possess thecognitive capacities for perspective taking in the context of
social interactions is hotly debated [27]. Policing several group
members remotely would also have been difficult for an animal
that had to keep his distance himself.
Individual Reinforcement in the Learning Queue
A dominant’s learning process could start only after all other
dominants waiting near the container gave up and left the
forbidden circle to pursue other activities or, in game parlance,
switched from G to R. Only then could onlookers see how the
provider opened the container that they could not open them-
selves. In Strasbourg and Donga, all dominants gave up their
attempts to monopolize the closed container after the first
few trials. In Picnic, however, a group that regularly raided
garbage bins and occasionally took food from tourists, the
highest-ranking female (F2, the one that also attacked the
provider) guarded the container from the start of the trial for
up to 88 min during the first six trials.
To avoid being the weakest link, each dominant had to learn
how his or her own guarding behavior influenced the behavior
of the provider. The higher its rank, the sooner the animal was
likely to learn restraint. This does not necessarily point to
superior cognitive abilities but can be explained by priority of
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Figure 2. Cumulative Individual Learning Curves
Cumulative time elapsed before each animal left the forbidden circle. The
idealized curve of a hypothetical dominant is shown in (A). These leaving
curves are closely correlated to the Weibull curves designated by the func-
tion R=Að12 2Þ2 ðx=LÞS , where R is the cumulative retreat time; A is the
asymptotic level (reached when the animal consistently shows restraint
from the start of the trial); L (indicated by arrows) is the breakpoint (trial cor-
responding with A/2), the first trial after which the animal left the forbidden
circle significantly faster than before; and s describes the steepness of the
slope. Average z values of Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit tests
between empirically observed and Weibull curves were 2.158 (Strasbourg),
3.419 (Donga), and 2.314 (Picnic). The vertical lines in (C) and (D) indicate
a break of >6 months between two series of trials in the Loskop groups.
M = male; F = female; numbers indicate rank, with 1 = highest rank.
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668access to learning opportunities. That high-ranking animals
learn first, because they have priority of access to the appa-
ratus, has been observed before in experiments in which
group-living animals had to solve technical problems (e.g.,
[28–30]). The accomplishment of our vervets has a different
quality, however: They had to motivate a conspecific from
a distance to perform the behavior they desired, as opposed
to handling an apparatus at close range, and they could never
be sure that their personal activities alone caused a specific
reaction of the provider. Each animal would have had little
opportunity to see an effect directly related to its own moves,
when the provider would have stayed at more or less the same
distance from the container until all individuals ranking above
her would have learned to stay away. Most dominants could
observe a faster approach by the provider when they retreated
earlier from the forbidden circle, as shown in Figure 3. This
effect lasted only a few trials, until the next in line began to
block the provider, but may have served as a crucial reinforce-
ment stimulating the dominant’s faster departure.
Patience and Cheek Pouches: Essential Ingredients of the
Solution
The point at which all players simultaneously showed restraint
would never have been reached without the remarkable
patience shown by the animals at the head of the learning
queue. Notably, in Strasbourg the queue was rather long,
and it took 30 trials before all eight dominants stayed outside
the circle simultaneously from the start. We see two nonexclu-
sive explanations for this forbearing attitude: (1) the temporary
improvements in opening times also reinforced the behavior of
the dominants that had already learned their lesson, and/or (2)
the deterioration in the provider’s behavior was not perceived
as being associated with intrusions by others.
The combination of cheek pouches (which only the
members of the cercopithecine family have among primates
[31]), patience, strong self-control, and the ability to learn
fast was essential for solving this coordination problem.
What we did not observe is perhaps even more remarkable:
neither punishment nor any conspicuous form of communica-
tion among the dominants that could have improved their
coordination. Nevertheless, multiple vervets managed to
show restraint simultaneously, in spite of being attracted to
the closed container, allowing the providers to make the
food available to all members of their groups.
Experimental Procedures
Study Groups
The Strasbourg group was held in a 0.5 ha densely wooded enclosure in the
Centre de Primatologie near Strasbourg, France. The group consisted of 25
individuals belonging to the West African species Chlorocebus sabeus [32]:
three adult males, eleven adult females (two of which died during the study),
and eleven juveniles and infants. The two South African Chlorocebus
pygerythrus groups had home ranges of about 3 km2 each that were about
3 km apart in the Loskop Dam Nature Reserve (M’Pumalanga, South Africa)
[15, 33]. TheDonga group had three adultmales, seven adult females, one or
two subadult males, and one or two infants; the Picnic group had three adult
males, four adult females, one juvenile male, and two to six infants.
Food Provider Experiment
At both study sites, we used identical (apart from details of the remote
controls, which were adapted from 12V car door locking mechanisms)
503 553 15 cm food containers, with wooden frames covered with plastic
mesh on all sides and reinforcedwith ametallic grid on top, allowing the ver-
vets to see and smell the food (Figure S4). In Loskop, we waited until the
groups were in a place that was suitable for the trials, an open area sur-
rounded by large trees in which the vervets could rest. We positioned the
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Figure 3. Description of Each Dominant’s Time
of Departure from the Forbidden Circle
Lower, filled lines: time needed to leave the
forbidden circle per individual. Upper lines: time
at which the provider opened the container
(blue, Strasbourg; green, Donga; orange, Picnic).
For each group, the animals are ordered accord-
ing to the trial at which they reached their
breakpoint L (see Figure 2). Note that each time
a dominant learned restraint, the provider
temporarily took less time, but they relapsed to
longer opening times when the next dominant
started monopolizing. M = male; F = female;
numbers indicate rank, with 1 = highest rank.
For the Donga and Picnic groups, the dashed
vertical line represents the >6-month break
between trial blocks 1 and 2.
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669video camera and synchronized the recording by means of an acoustic
signal that also announced the start of the trial to any animals out of sight
of the container. Throughout each trial, the location of all individuals within
20 m of the container was recorded every 30 s. At distances up to 10 m, we
estimated the distance to the nearest meter. Beyond 10 m, we used the
categories10–15 m, 15–20 m, and >20 m. Individuals that were out of sight,
which was never the case within a radius of 10m around the container, were
recorded as ‘‘not visible.’’ The opening of the container was filmed, and
providers were observed for the following hour.
Statistical Tests
Two-tailed statistical tests were performed using R (version 2.10.1) [34]. The
a level was set at 0.05.
Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Results, Supplemental
Game Theoretic Analysis, Supplemental Experimental Procedures, five
tables, three figures, and onemovie and can be found with this article online
at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2013.02.039.
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